The South China Sea is the most consequential unresolved file in Southeast Asian diplomacy, and the code of conduct is the instrument everyone says would improve it. Understanding why it has taken more than two decades requires understanding what the code would actually do, and what it would not.

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How we got here

In 2002, ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. It was political, not legal: a statement of intention to exercise restraint, settle disputes peacefully, and cooperate on marine research, safety and environmental protection. It had no enforcement mechanism and no definition of the activities it discouraged.

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Between 2026 and the declaration's first years lies a series of incidents involving fishing fleets, survey vessels, island construction, and coast guard encounters. Each incident produced statements from capitals, and each statement ended with a commitment to continue negotiating the code.

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ASEAN released a framework for the code in 2012, then guideline documents in later years. A single draft negotiating text has been described as the working basis at various moments during successive chairships. The gap between “working basis” and “adopted instrument” is where the entire difficulty sits.

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What a code would and would not do

A code is not a tribunal. It would not resolve sovereignty claims, and ASEAN has never pretended it could: the claims involve overlapping positions that no regional text can adjudicate.

What a code could do, at least as ASEAN has framed it, is establish conduct: what vessels may do when they meet, how close they may manoeuvre, how incidents are reported and managed, what constitutes escalation, and which channels are used first. Done properly, it would reduce the chance of an accident becoming a crisis.

Its main value would be procedural. A code creates expectations, a communications architecture, and a record of who behaved how. That is modest compared with the rhetoric around it, and more valuable than the rhetoric suggests.

The four difficult questions

First, scope: does the instrument cover the features and waters where incidents actually happen, or only a narrower defined area?

Second, legal character: is it binding, and if so, what follows from a violation? ASEAN members have disagreed among themselves about how far to push.

Third, third-party activity: what does the code say about military exercises, coast guard operations, and the presence of non-claimant navies, which several members regard as essential to regional resilience?

Fourth, dispute settlement: a code that creates obligations without any process for addressing breaches is a statement of intent with a new title.

Why consensus makes it harder

ASEAN's decisions require consensus among members whose approaches to the issue differ. Some are claimants, some are not, and some depend heavily on the same major partner whose cooperation the negotiation requires. A code that satisfies all of them will necessarily be less than the strongest claimant wants.

This is not a reason for resignation, but it is a reason for realism about what the summit can deliver. Progress will likely be described in terms of process: a text further consolidated, a set of issues referred upward, a timeline for another round.

What it means for the region and for the Philippines

The Philippines is a claimant, a coast guard operator in contested waters, a treaty ally of a global power, and this year the chair. Those roles pull in different directions, and the chairmanship's obligation to preserve ASEAN's consensus adds a fifth constraint.

For the wider region, the code matters because its failure would leave Southeast Asia without a shared language for maritime risk in a period when traffic, fishing pressure, and naval activity are all increasing. Whether the 49th Summit moves it forward will be judged by whether the negotiating track is given something more concrete than goodwill: a consolidated text, an agreed set of principles on incidents, and a date.

Frequently asked

Is the code of conduct legally binding? That is one of the negotiating questions, not a settled fact.

Does ASEAN speak for the claimants? No. ASEAN coordinates, but each claimant maintains its own position.

Would a code stop incidents? It would create expectations and channels. Whether incidents stop depends on whether the rules are followed.